Enhancing Press Freedom through Greater Privacy Law: A UK Perspective on an Australian Privacy Tort by Wragg, PM
	



	




	

	
	
	


	

	
				
 !

∀∀#∃%&∋(!)∗∀
+	
∀∀	,−
	
.	,	
	/,,#0&!)0120!3//4
((∋2( ∋
	



		

	5	

				

Enhancing Press Freedom 
through Greater Privacy Law:  
A UK Perspective on an 
Australian Privacy Tort 
Paul Wragg  
Abstract 
In light of previous inquiries identifying areas of concern in Australia’s 
privacy law provisions, the Australian Law Reform Commission (‘ALRC’) 
recently devised a new tort that, if implemented, would better protect 
individuals from serious invasions of privacy. Although the tort was designed 
principally with new technologies in mind, there has been vociferous concern 
that such a tort might unduly inhibit press freedom. This response is familiar 
to United Kingdom (‘UK’) commentators who have seen the press, in 
particular, react similarly to common law developments in privacy law. Yet 
that experience has not been entirely unfavourable to the UK press; indeed, 
the jurisprudence discloses a generous treatment of the term ‘public interest’, 
which has kept interference with press activity to a minimum. In light of the 
reference to press freedom within the ALRC’s proposed tort, and given the 
absence of an express constitutional provision protecting Australian press 
speech, this article argues that the UK experience shows how, 
counterintuitively, the ALRC’s proposed tort could actually enhance, rather 
than diminish, press freedom protection in Australia. 
 
New technologies enable perpetrators to invade a victim’s privacy in ways 
not previously possible. These serious invasions of privacy are 
multi-dimensional and complex. We would caution against a simplistic 
description of such acts as being ‘revenge porn’. [They include] the use of 
GPS to monitor victim’s movements … monitoring her contacts and abusing 
her friends and family. 
Women’s Legal Service Victoria and  
Domestic Violence Resource Centre Victoria1 

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For the ALRC to argue that there are gaps in [the law] is unconvincing … 
[The ALRC] also fails to recognise that invasions of privacy are not such a 
big issue in Australia … [An Australian Commonwealth privacy tort is] 
likely to lead to many legal actions against the media. There is little doubt 
that this would have a chilling effect on the media. 
Peter Bartlett, Minter Ellison2 
I Introduction 
The protection of individual privacy in the digital era is a global concern.3 Privacy-
invading technologies are ubiquitous: high quality cameras on mobile phones are 
widely available and images can be easily uploaded to the internet, surveillance 
devices in public spaces are the norm and there is a lucrative market in private 
data.4 Similarly, the prevalence of social media platforms creates cultural pressure 
to disclose private information in order to conform.5 Successive inquiries in 
Australia have identified substantial shortcomings in the law’s capacity to 
adequately and reliably protect individuals from serious invasions of privacy 
resulting from these new technologies.6 In light of this, the Australian Law Reform 
1 Women’s Legal Service Victoria (‘WLSV’) and Domestic Violence Resource Centre Victoria 
(‘DVRCV’) Submission No 97 to the ALRC, Serious Invasions of Privacy in the Digital Era: 
Discussion Paper (DP80), 12 May 2014, 3. 
2 Bartlett P, Submission No 79 to the Australian Law Reform Commission (‘ALRC’), Serious 
Invasions of Privacy in the Digital Era: Discussion Paper (DP80), 9 May 2014, 1–2. 
3 The issue has been considered in different contexts in the UK by the Leveson Inquiry: Lord Justice 
Leveson, An Inquiry into the Culture, Practices and Ethics of the Press: Report, HC 780 (2012) 
(‘Leveson Report’); by the Joint Committee on Privacy and Injunctions: Joint Committee on 
Privacy and Injunctions , Report of the Joint Committee on Privacy and Injunctions, House of 
Lords Paper No 273, House of Commons Paper No 1443, Session 2010–12 (2012); and by the 
House of Lords Communications Committee, which held a short inquiry into the adequacy of 
existing criminal law to protect individuals from the phenomena of ‘revenge porn’: House of Lords 
Communications Committee , Lords Question Facebook and Twitter on Social Media Offences 
(9 July 2014) <http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/lords-select/ 
communications-committee/news/smo-dps-acpo-fb-twitter/>. In Europe, the Court of Justice of the 
European Union recently held that Council Directive 95/46 EC provides individuals with a 
qualified right to be forgotten on the internet, Google Spain SL v Agencia Española de Protección 
de Datos (AEPD) (C̻131/12) [2014] QB 1022. The New Zealand Law Commission recently 
considered threats to privacy caused by the press and new media in its report, New Zealand Law 
Commission, which, among other things, led to the Harmful Digital Communications Bill (NZ): 
The News Media Meets ‘New Media’: Rights, Responsibilities and Regulation in the Digital Age, 
Report No R128 (2013). In Canada, the Office of the Privacy Commissioner has been pressing for 
wholesale reform of the Privacy Act for some time in order to tackle current privacy issues: 
Jennifer Stoddart (Privacy Commissioner of Canada) ‘The Necessary Rebirth of the Privacy Act’ 
(Speech delivered at the Library of Parliament, Ottawa, Ontario, 29 November 2013) 
<https://www.priv.gc.ca/media/sp-d/2013/sp-d_20131129_02_e.asp>. 
4 Katina Michael and Roger Clarke, ‘Location Privacy under Dire Threat as ‘Uberveillance’ Stalks 
the Streets’ (2012) 108 Precedent 24; Bruce Baer Arnold and Benjamin. Smith, ‘Private Faces and 
Public Spaces: Privacy and the Victorian Sexting Inquiry’ (2013) 10(2) Privacy Law Bulletin 18; 
Thomas Crofts and Murray Lee, ‘“Sexting”, Children and Child Pornography’ (2013) 35(1) Sydney 
Law Review 85. 
5 See, eg, Stephen Estcourt, ‘Social Media and the Lawyer’ (2013) 117 Precedent 24; Cheryl 
Cassidy-Vernon, ‘Cyber Bullying’ (2013) 40(7) Brief 20. 
6 ALRC, For Your Information: Australian Privacy Law and Practice, Report No 108 (2008); NSW 
Law Reform Commission, Invasion of Privacy, Report No 120 (2009); Victorian Law Reform 
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Commission (‘ALRC’) was tasked recently with devising ‘innovative ways’ in 
which the law might be improved.7 In its report, the ALRC recommends the 
creation of a new tortious cause of action (by means of an Australian 
Commonwealth statute) to guard against serious invasions of privacy.8 As the 
ALRC admits, and as will be discussed, the design of this tort has been strongly 
influenced by the UK’s well-established common law misuse of private 
information claim,9 derived from the House of Lords decision in Campbell v 
MGN10 (‘the Campbell jurisprudence’). 
As part of its inquiry, the ALRC invited submissions from stakeholders and 
received, in the main, two types of responses. In the first category were those who 
broadly supported the ALRC’s proposal for its potential application to novel 
methods of privacy invasion brought about by modern living, of which the 
submission by the Women’s Legal Service Victoria and Domestic Violence 
Resource Centre Victoria, noted above, is exemplary. To these stakeholders, the 
necessity of such a tort seemed obvious and pressing. In the second category were 
those who doubted the necessity of the tort and tended to express grave concern 
about its prospective adverse impact on press freedom,11 of which Bartlett’s 
submission, noted above, is representative. Such responses tended to be dismissive, 
reactionary and demonstrated a distinct unwillingness to engage with the problem. 
To be sure, the ALRC’s proposed cause of action is not directed primarily 
at the press. There is ample recognition within the report that the Australian press 
does not exhibit the same cultural malpractices that prompted the Lord Justice 
Leveson’s well-known inquiry into UK press practices.12 Similarly, the ALRC 
could not have been clearer that any prospective interference with press freedom 
would be minimal given that only claims concerning serious and unjustified 
invasions of privacy could succeed under the tort. It may also be noted that the 
ALRC’s recommendations are unlikely to be implemented given the Attorney 
General’s reported response to publication of the discussion paper: ‘The 
government has made it clear on numerous occasions that it does not support a tort 
of privacy’.13 
Notwithstanding this, the purpose of this article is to challenge the view that 
the ALRC’s proposed cause of action would inevitably damage Australian press 
Commission, Surveillance in Public Places, Report No 18 (2010); Law Reform Committee, 
Parliament of Victoria, Inquiry into Sexting, Parliamentary Paper No 230, Session 2010–13 (2013). 
7 ALRC, Serious Invasions of Privacy in the Digital Era, Report No 123 (2014), 5 (Terms of 
Reference) (‘ALRC Privacy Report’). 
8 Ibid 59 [4.1]. 
9 Ibid 22 [1.27]. 
10 Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] 2 AC 457. 
11 The terms ‘press’ and ‘press freedom’ are used throughout and refer to the traditional print and 
broadcast media. This terminology distinguishes individual expression since the free speech 
arguments for the protection of such may be of a different nature to the press. See, eg, Leveson 
Report, above n 3, vol I, 71–5 [2.4]–[3.13]. 
12 See, eg, ALRC Privacy Report, above n 7, 21 [1.19]–[1.21]. 
13 ‘Brandis Rejects Privacy Tort Call’, The Australian (online), 4 April 2014 
<http://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/legal-affairs/brandis-rejects-privacy-tort-call/story-
e6frg97x-1226873913819?nk=10ee36860543821fd6c05af86c202754>. 
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freedom, as Bartlett and others suggest.14 Drawing upon the ALRC’s 
recommendation that Australian courts might have regard to the Campbell 
jurisprudence when deciding cases involving the tort,15 it will be argued that, 
counterintuitively, the new law might not only protect press freedom, but also 
enhance it. Consequently, it will be argued that the collectively dismissive 
response by the press to the ALRC’s inquiry represents a significant missed 
opportunity. As the ALRC warns, the common law may develop organically to 
better protect privacy interests.16 As will be argued, this prospect presents the 
obvious risk that press interests are not as fully protected as they would be under 
the ALRC’s proposals. 
II Australian Privacy Law 
Given the purpose of this article, there will be no extensive discussion about the 
scope of Australian privacy law generally or whether a new specific privacy law is 
necessary. Instead, the discussion in this section focuses on those actions relevant 
to the press. Presently, the Australian common law is an unreliable source of 
protection. As the ALRC notes, although the traditional breach of confidence cause 
of action may be a useful means of preventing information from being disclosed by 
the press, it is less effective after the event given that the availability of damages 
for emotional distress is unclear.17 Historically, breach of confidence has been a 
troublesome claim to maintain because of the requirement to establish a 
pre-existing confidential relationship.18 As the ALRC also notes,19 the courts in the 
UK and Australia have softened their approach to this issue so that the claim may 
succeed if it is established that the information is confidential in nature and was 
imparted in circumstances importing a duty of confidence.20 Although personal 
information is likely to be treated by the courts as confidential, particularly where 
it relates to intimate aspects of a person’s life,21 there is a distinction between 
private information and confidential information — and it is possible that the 
information could lose its confidential status, where, say, it is publicly known, 
despite being private.22 
Significantly, though, unlike in the UK, the Australian approach to breach 
of confidence recognises no public interest defence and the possibility of adopting 
such has been consistently rejected.23 As Rolph, Vitins and Bannister note, 
14 See below nn 27–8 and accompanying text. 
15 ALRC Privacy Report, above n 7, 94 [6.14]. 
16 Ibid 23 [1.33]. 
17 Ibid 52 [3.50]. 
18 Coco v A N Clark (Engineers) Ltd [1968] RPC 41. 
19 ALRC Privacy Report, above n 7, 51 [3.48] citing Attorney General v Guardian Newspapers Ltd 
(No 2) (1990) 1 AC 109 (‘Spycatcher’) and Australian Broadcasting Commission v Lenah Game 
Meats Pty Ltd (2001) 208 CLR 199, 224 (Gleeson CJ). 
20 See, eg, Douglas v Hello! Ltd (No 3) [2006] QB 125, [83]. 
21 Stephens v Avery [1988] 1 Ch 449. 
22 See discussion in Mark Warby, Nicole Moreham and Iain Christie, The Law of Privacy and the 
Media (Oxford University Press, 2nd ed, 2011), 548–57. 
23 See discussion in David Rolph, Matt Vitins and Judith Bannister, Media Law: Cases, Materials and 
Commentary (Oxford University Press, 2010), 619–20. 
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Australian courts have doubted the wisdom of adopting the UK approach to breach 
of confidence given the risk of ‘ad hoc judicial idiosyncrasy’ associated with the 
task of balancing the public interest in maintaining confidences against the public 
interest in breaching them.24 Yet even if this position changed, in the UK the 
presence of a public interest does not provide a complete defence for the press: as 
Rolph, Vitins and Bannister also note, ‘even if there is a public interest justifying 
disclosure … it does not necessarily follow that the disclosure in the mass media is 
justified. Some other more limited or targeted disclosure … may be more 
appropriate’.25 This issue is now less significant in the UK given the protection 
afforded to public interest expression in misuse of private information claims 
(which many plaintiffs now rely upon instead of the traditional breach of 
confidence claim). Yet the ALRC suggests it may be a live issue in Australia since 
the lack of an adequate defence in breach of confidence claims may be causing the 
Australian press to actively settle claims against them in order ‘to avoid litigation, 
publicity and the setting of a precedent’.26 
The precarious nature of the Australian press’s position in breach of 
confidence claims makes its collective refusal to engage meaningfully with the 
ALRC’s proposals all the more surprising and, it is submitted, ill-judged. Rather 
than embrace the ALRC’s consistent recognition that any new privacy law must 
respect press freedom, there was little more than a blanket response from those 
representing press interests (including the Media & Communications Committee of 
the Law Council of Australia, News Corp Australia, SBS, ASTRA, ABC, and 
Guardian News & Media Ltd and Guardian Australia) that the proposals, if 
implemented, would seriously impact on press freedom and could not be 
countenanced. Some submissions were more vociferous than others. Barlett  
(a prominent media lawyer), for example, argued that the proposed tort would 
jeopardise press freedom by upsetting ‘the present balance between freedom of 
speech and a persons [sic] rights to privacy’.27 News Corp Australia offered an 
even more extreme view: 
The threat to freedom of speech and communication posed by a cause of 
action, regardless of how it is structured, will undermine our ability to report 
in the public interest, to the detriment of the Australian public and 
Australia’s democracy.28 
This claim is difficult to fathom, particularly without any accompanying 
commentary to justify the bald statement. Admittedly, it is understandable that the 
introduction of a new privacy law would adversely affect newspapers financially 
since they would be required to expend resources (monetary and administrative) 
defending claims that they may not otherwise have to defend.29 However, it will be 
argued, the ALRC’s proposals represent a more press-friendly alternative to the 
24 Ibid 620. 
25 Ibid 619. 
26 ALRC Privacy Report, above n 7, 21 [1.21]. 
27 Bartlett, above n 2. 
28 News Corp Australia, Submission No 112 to the ALRC, Serious Invasions of Privacy in the Digital 
Era: Discussion Paper (DP80), 12 May 2014, 1. 
29 Although the press must abide by the standards set by the Australian Press Council (‘APC’), which 
includes provisions protecting privacy, the APC has no power to award damages. 
624 SYDNEY LAW REVIEW [VOL 36:619 
current breach of confidence cause of action or the prospective development of the 
common law to fill the privacy law gap. 
The ALRC’s proposed cause of action has five parts, each of which would 
have to be satisfied for the claimant to succeed. Thus, the claimant must establish: 
a) that the invasion of privacy resulted from an intrusion into their seclusion 
or through misuse of personal information, 
b) in circumstances giving rise to a ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’, 
c) which was caused intentionally or recklessly (negligence is excluded), 
d) and was serious (though it need not cause actual damage), 
e) and was not justified by a countervailing public interest. 
As noted above, this test has been influenced by the Campbell jurisprudence, 
which establishes a two-part test in which: first, the claimant must satisfy the court 
that the information generates a reasonable expectation of privacy (this is a 
threshold test and the claim will fail if it is not satisfied); and, second, that the 
public interest in privacy is not outweighed by the public interest in disclosure. 
However, unlike in the UK, the ALRC recommends, significantly, that while the 
press bears the legal burden of adducing evidence to establish the public interest in 
the expression, it is the claimant who has the ‘legal onus to satisfy the court that 
the public interest in privacy outweighs any countervailing public interest’.30 
Consequently, press freedom is safeguarded in four significant ways under 
the ALRC proposal. First, the claimant must establish a ‘reasonable expectation of 
privacy’, otherwise the claim fails at the first hurdle. In the UK, this requirement 
has limited claims to those where something ‘essentially private’ about the 
claimant is disclosed by the information and, so, has prevented the cause of action 
from overreaching. Thus, for example, Sir Elton John could not show that 
photographs taken of him outside his London home met this threshold: the Court 
found there was nothing essentially private about them.31 Significantly, as this case 
shows also, there is no requirement for the press to justify everything it prints in 
public interest terms: it does not matter that there may be no public interest in the 
story if a reasonable expectation of privacy cannot be established.32 Second, not 
only must there be an invasion of privacy, but also the invasion must be serious. 
The Campbell jurisprudence already incorporates a seriousness standard within the 
reasonable expectation of privacy — the claim will not progress to stage two (the 
balancing act) unless a ‘certain level of seriousness’ has been established.33 In light 
of this and given the ALRC’s view that the Australian courts should have regard to 
the Campbell jurisprudence when determining cases, there is a danger of the 
seriousness standard being applied twice if not three times: first, through the 
‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ test where the UK standard (which already 
excludes non-serious intrusions) is taken as the benchmark; second, as a means of 
limiting interferences to those that not only satisfy the threshold standard, but also 
may be said to be a serious breach of that standard (so as to be highly offensive, for 
example); and, third, (potentially) through the use of the balancing approach 
30 ALRC Privacy Report, above n 7, 11 (Recommendation 9-3). 
31 John v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2006] EMLR 772. 
32 Ibid 776 [8]. 
33 R (Wood) v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2010] 1 WLR 123, 136 [22]. 
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should the court conclude that the intrusion must not only be serious but also so 
serious as to outweigh everyone else’s rights (ie, the relevant public interest). 
Clearly, it would work to the press’s advantage if the Australian court concluded 
that the instruction to have regard to the Campbell jurisprudence (where there is no 
overt mention of seriousness in the test) and the explicit reference to seriousness in 
the Australian model were intended to convey more limited protection for privacy 
invasion than the UK approach. Third, the press is protected by the explicit 
recognition that public interest expression justifies, in principle, intrusions into 
privacy. As noted above, this is more advantageous than the current breach of 
confidence cause of action (even that applied in the UK), where the presence of a 
public interest is less significant. Fourth, the press is further protected by the 
requirement that the burden of proof falls upon the claimant to show that the public 
interest in privacy outweighed the public interest in expression. 
In section IV (below), it will be argued that there is further cause for press 
optimism under the ALRC’s proposed model if the Campbell jurisprudence were 
adopted in Australia, given the generosity of the UK courts’ interpretation of the 
term ‘public interest’. In light of these claims, the apparent view of the Australian 
press that the status quo is preferable merits scrutiny. The view expressed by 
Bartlett and others34 that the cause of action is unnecessary because there is no 
comparable privacy-invading press culture in Australia compared to the UK is, as 
the ALRC notes,35 entirely circular: if the law does not guard against such invasions 
and regulatory bodies are unable to award damages then victims face a significant 
disincentive from turning to either for help. Also, Bartlett’s claim — that there is 
‘no evidence of such outrageous behaviour occurring here’36 like the phone-hacking 
scandal that prompted the Leveson Inquiry — may be overstated. First, the same 
was true of the UK prior to the scandal: there was no evidence of such ‘outrageous 
behaviour’. Second, the Leveson Inquiry unearthed far more problematic press 
behaviour than phone-hacking and instead cast light on a troubling and prevalent 
culture of widespread disregard for the dignity of others (including, significantly, 
ordinary members of the public) — not only in the stories themselves, but also in 
the newsgathering process.37 Further, it also brought to public attention the often 
cosy relationships between the press and the police, as well as the press and 
politicians.38 The absence of any outward evidence of scandalous press behaviour 
happening in Australia, therefore, is no guarantee that similar malpractices do not 
occur and the Leveson Report should be more accurately understood as a cautionary 
tale against complacency about press freedom. 
34 Similar points were also made in the following submissions to the ALRC Inquiry: News Corp 
Australia, above n 28, 2; Media and Communications Committee of the Business Law Section of 
the Law Council of Australia, Submission No 124 to the ALRC, Serious Invasions of Privacy in the 
Digital Era: Discussion Paper (DP80), 14 May 2014; Guardian News & Media Ltd and Guardian 
Australia, Submission No 80 to the ALRC, Serious Invasions of Privacy in the Digital Era: 
Discussion Paper (DP80), 9 May 2014. 
35 ALRC Privacy Report, above n 7, 21 [1.22]. 
36 Bartlett, above n 2, 2. 
37 See Paul Wragg, ‘Leveson and Disproportionate Public Interest Reporting’ (2013) 5(2) Journal of 
Media Law 241. 
38 See Jacob Rowbottom, ‘Politicians, the Press and Lobbying’ (2013) 5(2) Journal of Media Law 
253; Andrew Scott, ‘Tales of the Unexpected: Reflections on the Application of the Bribery Act to 
Chequebook Journalism’ (2013) 5(2) Journal of Media Law 276. 
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Moreover, such submissions do not sit well with the findings of previous 
law reform inquiries that identified several ways in which the present law fails to 
protect privacy interests.39 Regardless of the merits of these findings, the 
possibility exists that the common law may develop in order to address these 
shortcomings. Indeed, the ALRC comments that: 
Australian law is unlikely to stand still, given developments in other 
countries with similar legal systems and principles. Although Australia does 
not have a Human Rights Act, Australia is a signatory to the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which requires countries to protect 
the privacy of its citizens … It will be increasingly difficult to justify 
denying legal redress to people whose privacy has been seriously invaded, 
when other countries offer such redress.
40
 
As the ALRC notes,41 the High Court of Australia ‘[left] open the possibility’ of 
developing a privacy law in Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game 
Meats Pty Ltd.42 Similarly in Grosse v Purvis, a decision that took up the cudgels 
of Lenah Meats, the Queensland Court found that to succeed in such a claim, the 
plaintiff would need to show there had been: 
a) a wilful act by the defendant, 
b) that intruded upon their privacy or seclusion, 
c) in a manner that would be considered highly offensive by a reasonable 
person of ordinary sensibilities, 
d) and that caused the plaintiff detriment (physically or emotionally) or which 
prevented the plaintiff from acting in a manner to which they were 
entitled.43 
Noticeably, the test contains no public interest defence. Subsequent courts have 
been reluctant to follow Lenah Meats or apply this decision, even in 
Queensland.44 Admittedly, as the ALRC notes, the prospect of a common law 
privacy right has received a distinctly mixed reception, in which courts have 
variously accepted,45 rejected46 or otherwise sidestepped47 the proposition. In 
more recent cases, the courts have timorously echoed the possibility of a common 
law privacy tort without firm commitment either way.48 The ALRC concludes, 
mildly, that the law is ‘at best, uncertain’49 but this judgement is, frankly, far too 
kind: the law is a mess. 

39 These shortcomings are summarised in the ALRC Privacy Report, above n 7, 51–3 [3.50]. 
40 Ibid 23 [1.33]. 
41 Ibid 53–4 [3.53]. 
42 Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd (2001) 208 CLR 199, 328 
[335] (‘Lenah Meats’). 
43 Grosse v Purvis [2003] QDC 151 (16 June 2003), [444]. 
44 See Paul Telford, ‘If Only There was a Privacy App!’ (2012) 108 Precedent 10. 
45 Doe v Australian Broadcasting Corporation [2007] VCC 281 (3 April 2007). 
46 Kalaba v Commonwealth of Australia [2004] FCA 763 (8 June 2004), [6]. 
47 Chan v Sellwood [2009] NSWSC 1335 (9 December 2009), [34]; Giller v Procopets (No 2) (2008) 
24 VR 1. 
48 See ALRC Privacy Report, above n 7, 54–5 [3.55]. 
49 Ibid 55 [3.56]. 
2014] ENHANCING PRESS FREEDOM THROUGH GREATER PRIVACY 627 
As the Australian experience shows, relying on the common law to develop 
comprehensively is risky. The common law can only develop according to the facts 
before it and neither a coherent strategy, nor a sufficiently responsive set of 
principles, can be guaranteed.50 This sort of strategy has had, in some cases, 
disastrous consequences in the UK — as when s 127 of the Communications Act 
2003 (UK)51 was employed with too much vigour and too little rigour to 
‘offensive’ messages broadcast through social networking sites like Twitter. At its 
nadir, s 127 was used to prosecute a frustrated airline passenger who had 
complained online that he would ‘blow-up’ an airport if it did not ‘get [its] shit 
together’.52 Prompted by prosecutorial decision-making like this, and the sheer 
volume of potential prosecutions that would occur if this represented the standard, 
the Director of Public Prosecutions swiftly issued guidance reminding his 
prosecutors that only serious threats should be taken to court.53 
Perversely, the absence of a privacy-invading culture might work to the 
disadvantage of the Australian press should the common law develop organically. 
The early privacy claims after the Human Rights Act 1998 (UK) (‘HRA’) — which 
led to the Campbell decision — and most since, involved complaints against the 
press. The UK’s misuse of private information cause of action occurred not only 
due to the (then) recent introduction of the HRA,54 but also due to the willingness 
of legal pioneers to risk (comparatively) vast fortunes (in their own legal fees and, 
prospectively, their opponent’s) so as to challenge the compatibility of existing 
common law actions with the right to respect for privacy under art 8 of the ECHR. 
Thus, Naomi Campbell succeeded55 where others had enjoyed distinctly mixed 
success, to name a few: Catherine Zeta-Jones and Michael Douglas,56 Garry 
Flitcroft (a footballer),57 Jamie Theakston (a TV personality),58 David and Victoria 
Beckham59 and Heather Mills.60 Importantly, though, the press has had a 
significant say in how these principles developed and their interests have been 
well-represented in the principles that emerged. Australia’s privacy pioneers, 
however, have been, so far, citizens bringing claims against other citizens. If this 
trend continues, then principles may develop with little or no contemplation of 
their prospective effect on press freedom. In this light, the ALRC’s proposals are 
50 Thomas D C Bennett, ‘Emerging Privacy Torts in Canada and New Zealand: An English 
Perspective’ (2014) 36(5) European Intellectual Property Review 298. 
51 A provision with a lineage traceable to s 10(2)(a) of the Post Office (Amendment Act) 1935 (UK), 
which protected telephone operators from any sort of indecent, offensive or menacing messages: 
Chambers v DPP [2013] 1 WLR 1833, [27]. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Crown Prosecution Service, ‘DPP Publishes Final Guidelines for Prosecutions involving Social 
Media Communications’ (Latest News, 20 June 2013) <http://www.cps.gov.uk/news/latest_news/ 
dpp_publishes_final_guidelines_for_prosecutions_involving_social_media_communications/>. 
54 Among other things, the HRA gave further effect to the European Convention on Human Rights: 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, opened for signature 
4 November 1950, 213 UNTS 221 (entered into force 3 September 1953) (‘ECHR’). 
55 Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] 2 AC 457. 
56 Douglas v Hello! Ltd (No 1) [2001] QB 967. 
57 A v B plc [2003] QB 195. 
58 Theakston v MGN Ltd [2002] EMLR 398. 
59 Beckham v MGN Ltd (Unreported, England and Wales High Court, Queen’s Bench Division, 
Eady J, 28 June 2001). 
60 Mills v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2001] EMLR 41. 
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even more attractive for the greater certainty they provide that press interests are 
recognised and thoroughly accounted for. Moreover, it will be argued that if 
Australian courts closely followed the Campbell jurisprudence, press freedom 
would be not only protected, but also positively enhanced. In order to establish that 
claim though, the following section will show how this accommodation might be 
achieved, allowing for the obvious fact that Australia does not have a comparable 
HRA or ECHR at work in the background. 
III Accommodating UK Privacy Laws  
In its submission, the Australian Privacy Foundation (‘APF’) was particularly 
critical of the ALRC’s recommendation that the courts might usefully refer to the 
UK case law on misuse of private information.61 It argued that this would be 
inappropriate because, first, the UK cause of action is equitable not tortious; and, 
second, the UK approach follows from its obligations under the HRA of which 
there is no comparable Australian provision.62 These are both important points, 
although the first may be less significant given a recent first instance decision 
where the tortious status of the claim was confirmed by the courts. 63 As noted in 
that decision, the UK courts have consistently referred to the misuse of private 
information claim as a tort.64 
As for the second point, the absence of comparable constitutional 
provisions akin to the HRA or ECHR need not prevent the Australian courts 
incorporating principles from the Campbell jurisprudence into the common law. 
The proposed Act would, of itself, provide legislative confirmation of a right to 
privacy and freedom of expression, and of the need to balance the two together. 
The obligations imposed by the HRA, or the ECHR underpinning it, are no more 
onerous than this: both simply confirm, in bald terms, the existence of the two 
rights but say nothing about how clashing rights disputes should be resolved. 
Similarly, while Australia has no express constitutional provisions, the courts 
have demonstrated considerable versatility and aptitude in developing and 
protecting a range of implied constitutional rights — including the implied right 
of political communication (see below) — so they are not entirely unfamiliar with 
rights discourse. 
Further, in its treatment of press freedom at least, the influence of the 
obligations under the HRA and ECHR on the UK courts’ approach should not be 
overstated. There is a rich tradition within the common law of protecting press 
freedom generously which pre-dates the HRA.65 A particularly vivid example of 
61 APF, Submission No 110 to the ALRC, Serious Invasions of Privacy in the Digital Era: Discussion 
Paper (DP80), 12 May 2014, 1. 
62 Ibid 5–6. 
63 Vidal-Hall v Google Inc [2014] EWHC 13 (QB) (16 January 2014), [70]; cf Mosley v News Group 
Newspapers Ltd [2008] EWHC 1777 (QB) (24 July 2008), [181]–[197] where Eady J is more 
circumspect. 
64 These cases are discussed in Vidal-Hall, ibid [53]–[69]. 
65 See, eg, In Re X (A Minor) (Wardship: Jurisdiction) (1975) Fam 47; Woodward v Hutchins [1977] 
1 WLR 760. 
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this can be seen in R v Central Television Plc, where Lord Justice Hoffmann  
(as he then was), in the Court of Appeal, noted: 
Publication may cause needless pain, distress and damage to individuals or 
harm to other aspects of the public interest. But a freedom which is restricted 
to what judges think to be responsible or in the public interest is no freedom. 
Freedom means the right to publish things which government and judges, 
however well motivated, think should not be published. It means the right to 
say things which ‘right-minded people’ regard as dangerous or irresponsible. 
This freedom is subject only to clearly defined exceptions laid down by 
common law or statute. The principle that the press is free from both 
government and judicial control is more important than the particular case.
66
 
Similarly, in R v Beck,67 the Court of Appeal spoke of a press ‘right to 
report criminal trials’ unless prevented by statute. Given how easily the UK 
judiciary utilised the language of rights prior to its inception, it cannot be said that 
implementing the HRA has entailed a radical shift in thinking, particularly since the 
House of Lords has previously found the common law and ECHR approach to 
freedom of expression to be coterminous.68 In Spycatcher, Lord Goff said that this 
feature was ‘scarcely surprising, since we may pride ourselves on the fact that 
freedom of speech has existed in this country perhaps as long as, if not longer than, 
it has existed in any other country in the world’.69 His Lordship noted that: 
the only difference is that, whereas Article 10 of the Convention, in 
accordance with its avowed purpose, proceeds to state a fundamental right 
and then to qualify it, we in this country (where everybody is free to do 
anything, subject only to the provisions of the law) proceed rather upon an 
assumption of freedom of speech, and turn to our law to discover the 
established exceptions to it.
70
 
The Australian common law’s receptivity toward implied rights provides 
cause for optimism that it would not find the rights discourse in the Campbell 
jurisprudence overwhelmingly alien — albeit, as discussed below, the Australian 
approach to press freedom is markedly different from the UK’s. Moreover, there 
are pragmatic grounds for employing the Campbell jurisprudence in Australia, as 
the ALRC notes. Since it provides a ready-made source of principles for the courts 
to apply, Australia’s privacy pioneers do not have to spend vast sums to bring test 
cases, as happened in the UK. For example, Naomi Campbell incurred costs of 
around £500,000 (roughly $900,000) and, we might imagine, her opponents spent 
about the same.71 Millions more have been spent developing the principles. 

66 R v Central Independent Television plc (1994) Fam 192, [204]. 
67 R v Beck ex parte Daily Telegraph Plc (1992) 94 Cr App R 376, 381. 
68 Spycatcher (1990) 1 AC 109, 181 (Sir John Donaldson MR), 283 (Lord Goff); Derbyshire County 
Council v Times Newspapers Ltd (1993) AC 534. 
69 Spycatcher (1990) 1 AC 109, 283. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Campbell had retained her legal advisors on a conditional fee agreement (‘CFA’) which allowed for 
a 95% success fee, recoverable from her opponents. The rules on CFAs have since changed. See 
discussion in Kirsty Hughes, ‘Balancing Rights and the Margin of Appreciation: Article 10, Breach 
of Confidence and Success Fees’ (2011) 3(1) Journal of Media Law 29. 
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Admittedly, there is merit in a cautious approach to the UK art 8 
jurisprudence. It is fair to say the HRA experiment has not lived up to its frenzied 
anticipation72 and, at times, has placed the courts in an uncomfortable position 
where the line between politics and law has sometimes become distinctly blurred73 
— and, at other, times positively overstepped.74 The judiciary has found the right 
to respect to family and private life particularly challenging to accommodate. It has 
been relied upon in areas as varied as assisted suicide,75 confidentiality,76 
housing,77 immigration,78 unlawful detention,79 surveillance,80 and the principle of 
open justice.81 Putting it mildly, the right has become ‘difficult to delineate’.82 This 
is due, in part, to the use of ‘human dignity’ and ‘autonomy’ as means of 
determining its parameters: principles that want for clarity and coherence in a 
practical context.83 Unsurprisingly, the wide-ranging application of art 8 has 
contributed to the popular dislike of both the ECHR and HRA,84 and while at least 
some of these misgivings are due to the impact on press freedom,85 it has also been 
attributed to a failure by the judiciary (and supporters) to sufficiently recognise that 
it is a qualified (rather than absolute) right.86 These issues have been less 
pronounced in the Campbell jurisprudence, however the scope of the claim has 
been kept within manageable limits by a restricted reading of the privacy right, 
albeit the press has disliked the claim immensely, for obvious reasons.87 
The compatibility of the Campbell jurisprudence with the ALRC’s proposed 
tort may be doubted further given that the two claims, despite the considerable 
likeness between them, are not identical. First, as the APF rightly notes,88 the UK’s 
misuse of private information claim does not extend to intrusion into seclusion, at 
least not in a satisfactorily explicit way (as the ALRC notes, there is an arguable 
72 See, eg, sustained criticism by Ewing: K Ewing, ‘The Futility of the Human Rights Act’ [2004] 
Public Law 829; K D Ewing and Joo-Cheong Tham, ‘The continuing futility of the Human Rights 
Act’ [2008] Public Law 668. 
73 See, eg, D Nicol, ‘Law and Politics after the Human Rights Act’ [2006] Public Law 722. 
74 See, eg, D Campbell, ‘The Threat of Terror and the Plausibility of Positivism’ [2009] Public Law 501. 
75 R (Pretty) v DPP [2002] 1 AC 800. 
76 Douglas v Hello! Ltd (No 1) [2001] QB 967. 
77 Harrow LBC v Qazi [2003] UKHL 43. 
78 Huang v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] 2 AC 167. 
79 Secretary of State for the Home Department v JJ [2008] AC 385. 
80 R (Privacy International) v Revenue and Customs Commissioners [2014] EWHC 1475 (Admin) 
(12 May 2014). 
81 Re S (A Child) [2005] 1 AC 593. 
82 A Young, ‘Is Dialogue Working under the Human Rights Act 1998?’ (2001) Public Law 773, 776. 
83 It is often justified on the basis of human dignity, a principle that McCrudden has expertly 
scrutinised in a range of contexts and legal cultures and has found wanting — although, despite 
that, he believes it to be a valuable principle in determining rights cases: Christopher McCrudden, 
‘Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights’ (2008) 19(4) European Journal of 
International Law 655. 
84 Nicolas Bratza, ‘Living Instrument or Dead Letter — The Future of the European Convention on 
Human Rights’ (2014) EHRLR 116. 
85 Paul Dacre, ‘The Threat to Our Press’, The Guardian (online), 10 November 2008 
<http://www.theguardian.com/media/2008/nov/10/paul-dacre-press-threats>. 
86 See, eg, criticism by David Campbell, ‘Human Rights and the Critique of the Common Law’ 
(2005) Cardozo Law Review 791. 
87 See Dacre, above n 85. 
88 APF, above n 61, 5. 
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claim that the extension of the action to photographs touches on seclusion-type 
claims).89 However, as the ALRC also notes,90 the Protection from Harassment Act 
1997 (UK) covers at least some instances of seclusion-type claims91 and it is not 
unusual to find privacy and harassment claims pleaded together.92 Second, the 
Campbell test does not employ an explicit seriousness standard. Third, the burden 
of proof under the ALRC scheme is different to that found in the Campbell 
jurisprudence. Arguably, these differences are not as significant as they may 
otherwise appear (for the following reasons) and so ought not to prevent judicial 
engagement with the Campbell jurisprudence in Australia. 
Although the UK system does not apply to intrusions into seclusion  
(a move that has disappointed some commentators),93 the UK courts have used 
imaginative methods to extend the notion of ‘information’ so as to capture 
photographs of the plaintiff, even when engaged in anodyne behaviour. For 
example, the UK Court of Appeal accepted, in principle, that a photograph of JK 
Rowling’s infant son, being pushed down a busy Edinburgh high street, was 
capable of generating a reasonable expectation of privacy on the basis that a 
child’s expectations of privacy should be greater than an adult’s given a child’s 
comparative vulnerability.94 This principle was successfully applied to 
photographs of musician Paul Weller’s children, captured enjoying a family day 
out95 and in RocknRoll v News Group Newspapers Ltd,96 which related to 
photographs of Edward RocknRoll, husband of actress Kate Winslet, obtained 
from a Facebook account (viewable by 1500 ‘friends’ of the account holder) and 
depicting Mr RocknRoll in a state of undress at a party. The England and Wales 
High Court found little difficulty in holding that the information disclosed a 
reasonable expectation of privacy and that the privacy claim ought to succeed. 
Similarly, the Court has suggested that intrusions into seclusion are incompatible 
with art 8 rights, albeit without expressly extending the scope of the misuse 
claim.97 In Mosley, Eady J commented that ‘the very fact of clandestine recording 
may be regarded as an intrusion and an unacceptable infringement of Art 8 
rights’.98 Indeed, in a recent and important article, Moreham persuasively argues 
that, in light of cases like these, the UK common law could (and should) be 
extended to cover intrusions into seclusion.99 Even if the UK law did not develop 
in this way, at the very least these cases confirm there is an underlying 
compatibility between art 8 and the protection of intrusions into seclusion. 
89 ALRC Privacy Report, above n 7, 76–7 [5.17]–[5.20], referring, in particular, to N A Moreham, 
‘Beyond Information: Physical Privacy in English Law’ (2014) 73(2) CLJ 350. 
90 ALRC Privacy Report, above n 7, 80 [5.32]. 
91 Bayer CropScience Ltd v Stop Huntingdon Cruelty [2009] EWHC 3289 (QB) (22 December 2009). 
92 See, eg, AMP v Persons Unknown [2011] EWHC 3454 (TCC) (20 December 2011); AVB v TDD 
[2014] EWHC 1442 (QB) (12 May 2014). 
93 See, eg, Richard Mullender, ‘Comment: Privacy, Imbalance and the Legal Imagination’ (2011) 
19 Tort Law Review 109. 
94 Murray v Express Newspapers plc [2009] Ch 481, 502–4 [36]–[39]. 
95 Weller v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2014] EWHC 1163 (QB) (16 April 2014). 
96 RocknRoll v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2013] EWHC 24 (Ch) (17 January 2013). 
97 See, eg, R (Wood) v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2010] 1 WLR 123, 139–40 [34]. 
98 Mosley v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2008] EWHC 1777 (QB) (24 July 2008), [17]. 
99 ALRC Privacy Report, above n 7, 76–7 [5.17]–[5.20]. 
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Similarly, as noted above, although the Campbell test does not explicitly 
employ a seriousness standard, it is clear from the case law that trivial 
interferences with privacy will not meet the threshold required to advance the 
claim to the second part of the test (the balancing act). For example, in Author of a 
Blog, the Court found that an anonymous blogger could not rely upon the misuse 
of private information claim to prevent disclosure of his identity because ‘blogging 
is a public activity’.100 Moreover, in more recent cases, the courts have readily 
accepted the existence of a seriousness threshold in privacy claims. In McKennitt v 
Ash,101 the UK Court of Appeal found that the interference with private life must 
be ‘of some seriousness’ before art 8 engages. This principle has been applied, and 
embellished, in subsequent cases to find that art 8 ‘is not a guarantee of a 
comfortable life or a certain standard of living’;102 that a distinction should be 
drawn between information revealing the existence of a relationship and that which 
describes the nature of it (since the former is not generally a private matter);103 and 
that, if a seriousness threshold were not employed, the right might otherwise 
become ‘unreal and unreasonable’.104 Consequently, it is arguable that the 
Campbell jurisprudence and the ALRC’s proposals both require the plaintiff to 
show a serious invasion of privacy has occurred. 
Finally, there are subtle but meaningful differences in the manner claims are 
decided. Under the ALRC proposals, the plaintiff is burdened with persuading the 
court that the privacy claim is stronger than the public interest claim (albeit the 
defendant must provide evidence of the public interest said to be at stake).105 This 
suggests that the court can adopt, in effect, a passive role in the process; that 
determinations are based on no more than what the plaintiff and defendant present 
to justify their respective positions. In the UK, however, the courts’ role is more 
active. This is, for example, evident in its approach to balancing — in which, given 
the presumptive parity between the two rights, the court must decide whether it is 
necessary and proportionate to interfere with the privacy right while 
simultaneously deciding whether it is necessary and proportionate to interfere with 
the free speech right.106 Similarly, the burden of proof in the UK is neutral since 
where neither party advances a public interest defence (the defendant may simply 
wish to fight the case solely on the merits of the privacy claim),107 the courts must 
determine the public interest in expression, as part of its obligations under the 
HRA.108 Also, the courts will not award interim non-disclosure orders simply 
because the parties agree, since the court must consider the impact on the public’s 
freedom of expression rights.109 Whether this difference has any significant 
practical implication is debatable. In principle, however, it means that the UK 
100 Author of a Blog v Times Newspapers Ltd [2009] EWHC 1358 (QB) (16 June 2009), [11], [33]. 
101 McKennitt v Ash [2007] 3 WLR 194, 201 [12]. 
102 AAA v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2012] EWHC 2103 (QB), [87]. 
103 Trimingham v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2012] EWHC 1296 (QB), [285]. 
104 Weller v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2014] EWHC 1163 (QB) (16 April 2014), [27]. 
105 See ALRC Privacy Report, above n 7, 159–62. 
106 Re S (A Child) [2005] 1 AC 593, 603 [17]. 
107 See, eg, TSE v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2011] EWHC 1308 (QB) (23 May 2011), [7], [23], [27]. 
108 Ibid. 
109 JIH v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2011] EWCA Civ 42, [21]; Practice Guidance (Interim 
Non-Disclosure Orders) [2012] 1 WLR 1003. 
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courts can safeguard audience interests in the expression in a manner that, 
prospectively, the Australian courts seem unable to. Yet, given the vested interest 
of the press in protecting expression, the vulnerability of public interest expression 
may be more theoretical than substantial. 
Thus, although the UK’s misuse of private information claim arose from the 
law’s obligations under the HRA, its principles are sufficiently distinct that 
meaningful inferences may be drawn from the case law by Australian courts. 
Admittedly, the ALRC’s proposed tort would create privacy rights not previously 
recognised in Australia. However, it will be argued in the final section, this statute 
may also strengthen press rights which, of themselves, are currently poorly 
recognised in the Australian legal system. 
IV Enhancing Press Freedom 
As is well known, there is no equivalent right in Australia to the right to freedom 
of expression under art 10 of the ECHR or the First Amendment of the US 
Constitution. As the High Court has said, ‘[u]nlike the Constitution of the United 
States, our Constitution does not create rights of communication’.110 Instead, 
Australian press freedom comprises of two elements: a residual liberty to speak on 
any topic, occupying those areas that statute leaves untouched,111 and a narrow 
‘implied right to political communication’.112 Whether there is a meaningful 
difference between the UK and Australia in practice is debatable.113 However, in 
principle, the differences seem stark for although the Australian approach bears 
comparison to the UK position before the HRA,114 it will be argued that the 
Australian approach to public interest expression appears much weaker than its UK 
counterpart (even before the HRA). 
The implied right of political communication has been consistently 
described as a limitation on state power, rather than a personal entitlement.115 Since 
it does no more than ‘support the constitutional imperative of the maintenance of 
representative government’,116 the court needs only to be satisfied that the law does 
not have ‘a “direct”, rather than “incidental”, burden upon that communication’.117 
Chesterman has previously argued that the law’s approach to political expression 
has been particularly ‘unbalanced’ in prioritising overtly political expression 
concerning Parliament and public sector affairs (especially those involving the 
110 Levy v Victoria (1997) 189 CLR 579, 622. 
111 Brown v Classification Review Board (1997) 154 ALR 67, 76. 
112 Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520. 
113 For example, compare the distinctly similar approaches of the UK and Australian courts to cases 
involving the ‘Occupy’ movement despite the existence of a ‘right’ to free speech in one 
jurisdiction and a liberty in the other: The Mayor of London v Samede [2012] 2 All ER 1039 and 
O’Flaherty v City of Sydney Council (2014) 221 FCR 382. 
114 Rolph, Vitins and Bannister, above n 23, 32 note the House of Lords view then that there was no real 
difference between rights under art 10 and the common law’s treatment of freedom of speech given 
the range of circumstances under art 10(2) in which the right may be interfered with: Attorney 
General v Guardian Newspapers Ltd (No 2) (1990) 1 AC 109, 178 (Sir John Donaldson MR). 
115 See most recent statement in Unions NSW v New South Wales (2013) 304 ALR 266, 276–7 [36]. 
116 Attorney-General (SA) v Corporation of the City of Adelaide (2013) 249 CLR 1, 73–4 [166]. 
117 Hogan v Hinch (2011) 243 CLR 506, 555–6 [95]. 
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Commonwealth), leaving him to conclude that Australian free speech rights are 
distinctly ‘delicate’.118  
More recently, though, the High Court has declared that ‘the class of 
communication protected by the implied freedom in practical terms is wide’.119 
This view is rather cryptic or else seems to require a particularly generous 
treatment of the word ‘wide’. To support this claim, the Court referred to three 
other High Court decisions, but it is difficult to see how they substantiate the 
claim. The first is Hogan v Hinch and, in particular, the finding that the phrase 
‘governmental and political matters’ extends, potentially, beyond ‘the current 
functioning of government’ to ‘arguably’ the ‘social and economic features of 
Australian society’.120 This seems an underwhelming indication of a ‘wide’ 
meaning; this is no more than an ordinary understanding of the term ‘political’. 
Similarly, the second reference to the various judgments in Levy v Victoria121 does 
not seem particularly helpful since the case concerned an unsuccessful claim that 
entering a prohibited area to protest against the hunting of game birds constituted a 
form of political communication within the meaning of the implied right. Although 
the decision is useful in clarifying that there is some latitude in the term 
‘communication’ (ie, the means by which information and ideas are disseminated) 
so as to capture this sort of protest, and that ‘false, unreasoned and emotional 
communications’ may be included as well,122 the decision says nothing about the 
potential elasticity of the term ‘political’ and, therefore, nothing about the breadth 
of categories of speech falling within the implied right. The final reference is to the 
Theophanous decision and it seems strangest of all; here the Court decided there 
was ‘nothing’ in the law to provide ‘a private constitutional right to communicate 
at all times’ about the performance of Members of Parliament (‘MPs’) or their 
suitability for office.123 The concession in this case that ‘entertainment and politics’ 
may, on occasion, ‘merge’124 is also not as liberalising as it may otherwise appear, 
given the examples that the Court provides of such merging are confined to a 
television personality commenting on legislation or an actor seeking election —  
in other words, there is no merge, there is simply political expression through the 
medium of an entertainer. 
Although the Australian approach to freedom of speech appears 
parsimonious,125 especially from a comparative perspective, recognition of it as a 
residual liberty provides some protection, at least. Obviously, in principle, threats to 
118 Michael Chesterman, Freedom of Speech in Australian Law: A Delicate Plant (Ashgate, 2000),  
60–63; see also Adrienne Stone, ‘Rights, Personal Rights and Freedoms: The Nature of the 
Freedom of Political Communication’ (2001) 25 Melbourne University Law Review 374. 
119 Attorney-General (SA) v Corporation of the City of Adelaide (2013) 249 CLR 1, 43–4 [67]. 
120 Hogan v Hinch (2011) 243 CLR 506, 543–4 [49]. 
121 Levy v Victoria (1997) 189 CLR 579. 
122 Ibid 623. 
123 Theophanous v Herald & Weekly Times Ltd (1994) 182 CLR 104, 206. 
124 Ibid 123. 
125 See criticisms in Anne Twomey, ‘The Application of the Implied Freedom of Political 
Communication to State Electoral Funding Laws’ (2012) 35(3) University of New South Wales Law 
Journal 625; T. Campbell and S. Crilly, ‘The Implied Freedom of Political Communication, 
Twenty Years on’ (2011) 30(1) U Queensland LJ 59; cf Adrienne Stone, ‘Insult and Emotion, 
Calumny and Invective: Twenty Years of Freedom of Political Communication’ (2011) 30(1) 
University of Queensland Law Journal 79. 
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freedom of speech (and press freedom), arise where the law protects behaviour that 
adversely affects expression (directly, eg, defamation, or indirectly, eg, regulation of 
highways affecting public demonstrations) without adequate judicial protection of 
speech. As is well recognised, the residual liberty approach is weak where the law 
does not protect ‘important’ expression126 or expression that does not cause 
sufficient harm to others.127 Although the national uniform defamation law allows 
for the protection of public interest expression as part of the qualified privilege 
defence,128 the concern expressed by stakeholders, such as News Corp Australia, 
that the proposed privacy law would damage press freedom is understandable given 
the judicial attitudes toward freedom of speech discussed above. Yet News Corp’s 
major argument that the ALRC’s privacy tort would ‘prioritise’ the privacy interest 
and seriously threaten free speech because ‘freedom of speech in Australia is not 
enshrined in a legislative right, and it would not have an equivalent legal right to 
that which privacy would have under a cause of action’129 is far from persuasive.  
It is difficult to penetrate the logic of this concern because the ALRC’s proposal,  
if transposed to law, would enshrine the right to freedom of expression (and press 
freedom) in law through the explicit mention of the right. 
It may be of some concern, though, to News Corp Australia, and others, that 
privacy-invading expression would not be treated by the courts as public interest 
expression, sufficient to outweigh the privacy interest. Australia may not have the 
same press culture of privacy invasion as the UK (or US), but a survey of the 
adjudications by the Australian Press Council (‘APC’) adequately demonstrates 
that privacy invasion still occurs. The APC has upheld 19 complaints of privacy 
invasion since January 2005. In the same period, the UK Press Complaints 
Commission (‘PCC’) upheld 33 complaints. Thus, despite the claim that the two 
cultures are markedly different, these two figures are surprisingly similar. 
Admittedly, there may be a number of explanations to account for this similarity 
— for example, the PCC may have been less receptive to privacy complaints than 
the APC is. The Leveson Report was particularly critical of the PCC’s lack of 
independence from industry.130 However, it shows, at least, that it would be wrong 
to say Australia has no culture of invading privacy. Moreover, the APC’s approach 
to privacy complaints appears robust: its general principles state that the press 
should ‘[a]void intruding on a person’s reasonable expectations of privacy, unless 
doing so is sufficiently in the public interest’. However, its adjudications 
demonstrate a preparedness to uphold complaints which overstep the mark, the 
most egregious of which concerned the organiser of a protest blocking Sydney’s 
roads at rush-hour. The Daily Telegraph published his mobile phone number and 
urged readers to complain to him personally by phone call or text message.  
126 See, eg, Frederick F Schauer, Free Speech: A Philosophical Enquiry (Cambridge University Press, 
1982). 
127 See, eg, Ronald Dworkin, ‘Is There a Right to Pornography?’ (1981) 1(2) Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies 177. 
128 See discussion in David Rolph, ‘A Critique of the National, Uniform Defamation Laws’ (2008) 
16(3) Torts Law Journal 207; Andrew T Kenyon, ‘Six Years of Australian Uniform Defamation 
Law: Damages, Opinion and Defence Meanings’ (2012) 35(1) University of New South Wales Law 
Journal 31. 
129 News Corp Australia, above n 28, 5. 
130 Leveson Report, above n 3, vol IV, 1515–16 [1.5]. 
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In upholding his complaint, the APC noted that it was ‘difficult to imagine a more 
grievous invasion of individuals’ [sic] privacy’.131 
If the prospective treatment of privacy-invading expression is a concern for 
the press, then it may be misplaced if the UK experience is indicative of how the 
Australian system would develop. To be sure, the UK courts have interfered with 
press freedom where there is no discernible justification for the interference with 
privacy132 or no convincing one, as in the paradigm case of Mosley.133 In Mosley, 
the Court systemically deconstructed the newspaper’s weak claim that the graphic 
(in all senses of the word) portrayal of Max Mosley’s private encounters with five 
sex workers was in the public interest because it showed a fetish for Nazism. 
Similarly, the courts have been unpersuaded that exposure of adultery, for 
example, is, by itself, a matter of public interest.134 
Nevertheless the courts have been exceedingly generous toward press 
freedom in this context. First, they have interpreted the term ‘public interest’ 
broadly. This treatment began in Campbell v MGN Ltd,135 where the House of 
Lords found that there was an ‘undoubted [public] right to know that [model 
Naomi Campbell] was misleading the public when she said that she did not take 
drugs’ (but that details of her treatment was of ‘a much lower order’ than this 
information).136 Although subsequent decisions suggest a judicial inclination to 
pare back this right, through casual inclusion of a condition that any deception 
must be ‘serious’,137 this qualification has not been universally applied and, in any 
event, is unpersuasive — for what is ‘serious’ about knowing that a model lied 
about an aspect of her private life? In Hutcheson v News Group Newspapers Ltd,138 
the UK Court of Appeal found that the public right not to be misled was at stake in 
a publication concerning an ongoing feud between celebrity chef Gordon Ramsay 
and his father-in-law, Christopher Hutcheson, which informed readers that 
Mr Hutcheson had, for some time, kept a second family without his first family’s 
knowledge.139 This principle was also applied in Ferdinand v MGN Ltd140 on the 
basis that Premier League footballer, Rio Ferdinand, had misled the public, 
through his autobiography, into believing he was a reformed character who no 
longer cheated on his long-term partner. 
The courts have also found that an individual’s role model status may count 
as public interest expression where the individual acts in an unbefitting manner. 
The most extreme application of the principle can be found in A v B plc,141 where 
131 Australian Press Council, Adjudication No. 1344: Robinson/The Daily Telegraph (February 2007) 
<http://www.presscouncil.org.au/document-search/adjudication-no-1344-robinson-telegraph-feb-2007/>. 
132 See, eg, TSE v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2011] EWHC 1308 (QB) (23 May 2011). 
133 Mosley v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2008] EWHC 1777 (QB) (24 July 2008) 
134 Ntuli v Donald [2011] 1 WLR 294; CDE v MGN Ltd [2010] EWHC 3308 (QB) (16 December 
2010). 
135 Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] 2 AC 457. 
136 Ibid 490 [117]. 
137 See, eg, CTB v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2011] EWHC 1232 (QB) (16 May 2011), [25]; 
Lord Browne of Madingley v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2008] QB 103, 119–20 [49]–[50]. 
138 Hutcheson v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2011] EWCA Civ 808 (19 July 2011). 
139 Ibid [43]. 
140 Ferdinand v MGN Ltd [2011] EWHC 2454 (QB) (29 September 2011), [66]–[68]. 
141 A v B plc [2003] QB 195. 
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the Court of Appeal found that there was a public interest in the plaintiff’s private 
life since, as a footballer, he was a ‘role [model] for young people and undesirable 
behaviour on [his] part can set an unfortunate example’.142 Although this finding 
has been heavily criticised in the academic commentary143 and by the courts,144 it 
was resurrected recently in Ferdinand, where it was accepted that the plaintiff’s 
role as England Football Club (‘FC’) captain made his off-field behaviour a matter 
of public interest.145 Similarly, it was accepted in Goodwin v News Group 
Newspapers that an affair between a powerful businessman and junior colleague 
would be ‘of concern to an audience much wider than the work colleagues of either 
partner in the relationship’ and that ‘there may be a public interest if the sexual 
relationship gives rise to conflicts with professional interests or duties’.146 
Furthermore, the courts have accepted that the press enjoys a wide ‘freedom 
to criticise … the conduct of other members of society as being socially harmful, 
or wrong’.147 The Court of Appeal in Hutcheson described this as a ‘powerful’ 
argument in favour of privacy-invading expression.148 It was also used in 
Ferdinand149 and, more recently, McClaren v News Group Newspapers Ltd to 
justify a story revealing that former England FC manager, Steve McClaren, was 
having an adulterous affair with the former lover of the England manager previous 
to him.150 Although the limits of this potentially broad justification have yet to be 
fully tested,151 clearly there is tremendous scope for much speech expressing moral 
indignation to fall within it. These broad devices, collectively, show that privacy-
invading expression commenting on the moral behaviour of individuals may fall 
within the definition of public interest. 
Second, it is not only judicial generosity toward the meaning of public 
interest that has assisted press freedom in this area. The courts’ approach to (and, 
arguably, adaptation of) the Campbell methodology has also assisted since the 
courts have found that the existence of a public interest in the expression is the 
‘determinative factor’ (according to the UK Court of Appeal)152 and that, where 
there is a public interest at stake, the law ‘scarcely’ permits interference (according 
to the UK Supreme Court).153 This type of approach ought to address News Corp 
Australia’s concern that the proposed tort would inevitably ‘privilege’ privacy 
interests: the UK experience shows, indisputably, that this is not the case. Third, 
the UK courts have similarly found that the privacy claim cannot be used to protect 
142 Ibid [43(vi)]. 
143 See, eg, Helen Fenwick and Gavin Phillipson, Media Freedom under the Human Rights Act 
(Oxford University Press, 2006), 799. 
144 McKennitt v Ash [2007] 3 WLR 194, 217 [65]. 
145 Ferdinand v MGN Ltd [2011] EWHC 2454 (QB) (29 September 2011), [87]–[93]. 
146 Goodwin v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2011] EWHC 1437 (QB) (9 June 2011), [103]. 
147 Terry v Persons Unknown [2010] EWHC 119 (QB) (29 January 2010), [104]. 
148 Hutcheson v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2011] EWCA Civ 808 (19 July 2011) [29]. 
149 Ferdinand v MGN Ltd [2011] EWHC 2454 (QB) (29 September 2011), [63]. 
150 McClaren v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2012] EWHC 2466 (QB), [19]. 
151 See Paul Wragg, ‘The Benefits of Privacy-Invading Expression’ (2013) 64(2) Northern Ireland 
Legal Quarterly 187. 
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against the disclosure of ‘bare facts’. This principle is apparent in Campbell and 
subsequent cases154 and further addresses News Corp’s concern. 
Finally, it should be noted that the UK courts have not found against the 
press in circumstances where a public interest, narrowly conceived, has been at 
stake.155 The nearest that the courts have come to doing so was in Greencorns Ltd v 
Claverley Group Ltd,156 which involved a news story about a care home for 
troubled teenagers. Following newspaper publication of an intended location for 
the home, an angry mob (with shades of Mill’s classic example)157 descended upon 
the address and violently protested. Although the Court accepted that there was a 
‘high public interest [in] how such children should be cared for’, it did not find this 
interest to be at stake in the contested expression (the publication of the address), 
but instead found it raised ‘a series of private interests’ concerning the location of 
the home and whether ‘there will be such a house next door or in their street’.158 
In addition to this doctrinal justification for an enhanced reading of press 
freedom, the UK courts’ approach may also be defended on normative grounds.  
As is well recognised in the academic literature, the justification(s) for the special 
treatment of press freedom (and free speech generally) is controversial.159 Broadly, 
there are three dominant arguments that seek to defend freedom of expression for 
its contribution to democratic participation,160 or the process of discovering ‘truth’ 
(in the Enlightenment sense of self-discovery or self-fulfilment),161 or in 
recognition of the autonomous nature of individuals.162 The UK courts’ treatment 
of public interest plainly recognises speaker (and audience) interests in broader 
terms than simply democratic participation, and, in particular, seems to give 
greater recognition to the self-fulfilment value as well.163 This, of itself, would be a 
departure from the Australian courts’ approach which, as others have noted,164 has 
tended to stick closely to narrow conceptions of the democratic participation value. 
154 Browne of Madingley v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2008] QB 103, [59]; Ntuli v Donald [2011] 
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Press, 1977), 260: 
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159 See, eg, Schauer, above n 126. 
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Review 245. 
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Indeed, it has been argued that the Australian courts’ approach is so narrow that 
even classic democratic participation arguments, such as Meiklejohn’s,165 could 
not be said to apply since Meiklejohn would have extended protection, on such 
terms, to philosophy, science, literature and the arts ‘but it can hardly be claimed 
that [such speech] is “necessary for the effective operation of that system of 
representative and responsible government provided for by the Constitution”’.166 
Instead, the Australian judicial approach seems to have more in common with (US) 
Justice Bork’s argument that, if a principled reading is to be realised, the First 
Amendment should protect only ‘speech that is explicitly political’.167 Greater 
adherence to the UK misuse of private information case law, therefore, would 
strengthen (prospectively) Australian press freedom through greater recognition of 
the broader democratic participation and self-fulfilment values at stake. 
Although the Strasbourg jurisprudence envisages protection on these 
terms,168 the UK press freedom principles discussed above have arisen 
independently of that jurisprudence. The notion that ‘misleading the public’ is a 
public interest matter can be traced through the common law,169 and is particularly 
evident in cases involving intellectual property.170 The law’s recognition of role 
model status as a public interest matter is much more recent. Outside of its 
common usage in family and criminal law cases,171 it is hard to find reference to it 
before the House of Lords decision in Reynolds v Times Newspapers Ltd (where 
the Court acknowledged that the concept of ‘political discussion’ could include 
speech about role models)172 and the first consideration of it as a reason to interfere 
with privacy occurred in A v B plc at first instance (where the Court rejected the 
newspaper’s argument that the claimant was a role model).173 The argument was 
later accepted, though, in Theakston174 and on appeal in A v B plc.175 The Court’s 
most recent principle that the press enjoys a freedom to criticise the immoral 
behaviour of others stems from the Court’s view of newspapers historically,176 
although the more general freedom to criticise the judiciary177 and government178 
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has a long history in the case law.179 This evidence further strengthens the claim 
that the UK’s approach to privacy-invading expression does not rely upon its 
obligations under the HRA. Indeed, as noted above, such generosity toward press 
freedom is readily apparent in the common law prior to this. 
As these points demonstrate, the UK courts recognise a broader category of 
information to be of public interest than that falling within classic understandings 
of the term ‘political’. Consequently, what might be dismissed initially as celebrity 
gossip or of prurient interest only, may be categorised, on closer inspection, as a 
morally driven claim about the state of celebrity milieu or society more generally. 
It is here that Australian press freedom might be not only better protected, but also 
positively enhanced through greater engagement with the Campbell jurisprudence. 
The UK judicial treatment of privacy-invading expression by the press appears 
much more generous than the Australian courts’ interpretation of freedom of 
speech and, particularly, the implied right of political communication. 
V Conclusion 
Australian press complaints about privacy reform seem out of touch with popular 
sentiment and detached from the reality of what the ALRC proposes. As is clear 
from the ALRC’s various investigations,180 there is a popular consciousness about 
the harm of privacy intrusion and a concern that government should provide 
meaningful protection against it. As the ALRC has also noted, the law is presently 
inadequate to cater for all of these privacy concerns. It is entirely possible that the 
Australian common law will develop organically to address these gaps without any 
involvement from press defendants. Even if that does not occur, the present most 
likely cause of action against the press for privacy invasion (breach of confidence) 
does not provide a defence that would otherwise protect press freedom. Given 
these two circumstances, the generally dismissive and uncooperative collective 
position of the press in response to the ALRC’s inquiry is difficult to understand. 
Not only has the ALRC proposed a cause of action that is elegantly framed and 
eminently workable, but also it has created a tort that recognises and protects press 
freedom interests. 
Admittedly, it is understandable that the press may feel apprehensive about 
prospective judicial treatment of privacy-invading expression given the courts’ 
approach to the implied right of political communication. It is also understandable 
that it should have some misgivings about incorporation of the UK misuse of 
private information claim given the UK’s mixed HRA experience. Yet the 
prospective incorporation of the Campbell jurisprudence is good news for the 
press. It allows for development of the law in terms that explicitly recognise press 
freedom (and on a statutory footing), and provides the courts with an established 
jurisprudence in which privacy-invading expression enjoys healthy protection in 
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generous terms that extend beyond narrow conceptions of political expression to 
include gossip and the condemnation of immoral behaviour. Statutory recognition 
of press freedom would be an improvement, of itself, but recognition that privacy-
invading expression exposing public figure immorality is a public interest matter, 
particularly in the terms used by the UK courts to express this value, represents a 
positive enhancement of press freedom rights. A privacy statute is a win–win for 
press and public alike. 
